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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENNETT LEASING CO., A Utah 
Corporation, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
WALKER REALTY INC., A Utah 
Corporation, and RALPH WALKER, 
an individual, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Defendants, Third party / 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
M. K. KOMPUTER CORPORATION, A 
Corporation, 
Third Pary Defendant 
and Appellant. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 16458 
This is an action based in contract where the Plaintiff-
Respondent purchased a computer from the Third Party Defendant-
Appellan t and leased the computer to the Defendants, Third Party 
Plaintiffs-Respondents. The Defendant, Third Party Plaintiff-
Respondent defaulted on the lease seeking to have the Third Party 
Defendant-Appellant repurchase the computer pursuant to a buy 
back agreement. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On December 12, 1978, the matter was tried before the Honorable 
VeNoy Christofferson, sitting without a jury. On the 23rd day of 
January, 1979, judgment was awarded in favor of Plaintiff-
Respondent in the amount of four thousand four hundred sixty dollars 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
and forty six cents ($4,460.46), together with attorn , . 
ey S lee 
in the amount of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). As to tr. 
Third Party claim the court ruled j n f0v0r of Third Party-
Plaintiff-Respondent for all amounts due by the Defendants,. 
Party Plaintiffs-Respondents to the Plaintiff-Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to reverse the decision of the District 
Court rendering it liable for all amounts the Defendants, ~· 
Party Plaintiffs-Respondents have been adjudgec1 to owe thePla: 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 12, 1976, the Defendant, Third part 
Plaintiff-Respondent, Ralph \'lalker (hereinafter referred to I 
including Walker Realty) indicated his desire to purchase a~ 
SX 320 computer with real estate program systems from the Th;: 1 
Party Defendant-Appellant, M. K. Komputer Corporation ( hece,-1 
referred to as M. K.), by signing a purchase invoice. Waike: 
thereafter indicated a desire for financing on the computer,' 
accordingly, a lease contract was entered into between Walker 
and the plaintiff-respondent, Bennett Leasing Company (herein) 
referred to as Bennett) . The nature of the transaction was'. 
M. K. sold the computer to Bennett for cash, and thereafter, : 
Bennett entered into a lease agreement with Walker, requirinc 
montly payments on the computer system. 
d j 
On October 15, 1976, representatives from M. K. picke 0', 
1 A· rport · Cannon SX 320 computer at the Salt Lake Internationa 1 · 
· on his' , 
delivered said computer to Walker and installed it up 
ness premises. On the day of installation, three represenc.: 
-2-
... 
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of M. K. were present including President Thomas Kunz, Vice Presi-
dent David Morris, and Sales Representative Robert Huff. A 
training session was undertaken at that time to acquaint Walker and 
his agents-employees in the use of the Cannon computer and M. K.'s 
real estate system. 
At the time of the delivery of the system, Robert Huff, 
salesman for M. K., indicated on the invoice, a copy of which 
was left with Walker, that there was a 90-day buy back agreement 
between M. K. and Walker. 
Representatives of M. K. and Walker had a difficult time in 
getting together for training sessions with M. K.,apparently 
missing one appointment and Walker's representatives not being 
present on at least two occasions when appointments had been made 
to provide further training to Walker and his employees in the use 
of the computer. 
On November 8, 1976, a letter was received at the Ogden office 
of M. K. from Walker. The letter was dated November 4, 1976, and 
contained several requests, most importantly, for the written buy 
back agreement that Walker had been advised of at the time of the 
original purchase. In response to the Walker letter, David Morris 
traveled from Ogden to Logan on November 11, 1976, for the purpose 
of delivering additional tape systems, providing training, and de-
livering the buy back agreement. Morris testified that he de-
livered the tapes requested by Walker in his letter of November 
4, 1976, delivered the buy back agreement, and made an appointment 
for an additional training session with Walker on November 15, 1976. 
(T. pp. 157-159) Morris further testified that Walker appeared 
tn Lie in a hurry to make an appointment outside of his office and 
-3-
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...., 
simply said he would get back with Morris later. (T. p. 81) 
buy back agreement was signed by Thomas Kunz of M. K. and they 
retained two copies for their files (Exhibits #4 and #10) with 
walker being unable to produce his copy of the buy back agreement 
at trial. 
On January 21, 1977, M. K. received a letter from Walker 
dated January 20, 1977, containing Walker's first negatives~~ 
ments regarding the computer and the fact that he was then exer-
cising his option under the buy back agreement and was requestiM 
that M. K. purchase back the computer system. 
In response to the January 20 letter, representatives of M.~ 
called Walker several times on January 24 and 25. 
I 
(T. p. 119) Ori 
January 25, 1977, Thomas Kunz succeeded in reaching Walker and 
arranged a meeting for the following day. 
On January 26, 1977, representatives of M. K. met with \valker 1 
in Logan to discuss Walker's letter of January 20, 1977. Present 
at that meeting were Thomas Kunz and David Morris of M. K., and 
Ralph Walker. In his testimony, Walker indicated that Kunz 
requested a 30-day extension on the buy back agreement to facili-
: 
tate further training of Walker's personnel. (T. pp. 70-71) How·'. 
ever, Kunz and Morris stated emphatically that they 
as of that date, that M. K. would not repurchase the 
advised Walker, i 
computer equip· I 
I 
, ' 
ment because of Walker's total lack of compliance with the terms or · 
the buy back agreement. (T. pp. 122-123) At the time of trial 
Walker produced no evidence showing an extension other than hls 
testimony, which was refuted by other parties present at the 
meeting. 
Thereafter, the agents of M. K. continued their attempts tc 
-4-
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train Walker's staff. Walker later renewed his request that M. K. 
repurchase the computer. In response to Walker's requests, M. K. 
sought potential parties who would assume the lease in order to , 
maintain M. K. 's public image. 
As of the trial date the computer remained in the possession 
of Walker, without Walker making any further payments upon the 
obligation to Bennett Leasing. At the time of trial, representatives 
cl M. K. and Walker presented conflicting evidence regarding the 
buy back agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE DEFENDANT, THIRD PARTY 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT A JUDGMENT ON A THEORY SUBSTANTIALLY 
VARIANT FROM ITS PLEADING. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law the trial 
court determined that M. K. and Walker had a valid buy back 
agreement and that Walker had substantially performed its 
obligations under that agreement and permitted Walker to recover 
on the contract, although Walker's Third Party action sounded 
exclusively in the tort of fraud. 
A. A PARTY MUST RECOVER, IF AT ALL, ON THE CASE MADE BY 
ITS PLEADINGS. 
The Third Party Complaint (R. 19) of Walker sets forth a 
cause of action against M. K. exclusively in fraud. Such cause 
of action sets forth allegations in comport with the requirements 
this Court outlined in Pace v. Parrish, 247 p. 2d 273 (Utah, 1952); 
those elements being: 
a. That a representation was made; 
-5-
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b. 
c. 
d. 
concerning a presently existing material fact; 
which was false; 
which the representer either 
1. knew to be false, or 
2. made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
e. for the purpose of inducing the other party to act 
upon it; 
f. that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance 
of its falsity; 
g. did in fact rely upon it; 
h. and was thereby induced to act; 
i. to his injury and damage. 247 P. 2d at 274-275. 
Indeed, the language of the Third Party Complaint utilized 
phrases similar to those found in Pace. However, further similar· 
ities between the two cases do not exist. The standard for proo' 
in a fraud case, as set out in Pace, is clear and convincing 
evidence. Pace v. Parrish, supra at p.274. In the case at bar 
Walker failed to establish such a level of proof; indeed, Walker 
did not even attempt to meet that burden. Armed with the knowleo 
that the heavy burden could not be satisfied Walker abandoned thE 
fraud theory at the trial to pursue a breach of contract action. 
an action created a variance from the pleadings. 
In permitting Walker to recover on the contract theory, spr~ 
on M. K. at trial, the trial court abandoned a rule accepted by 
courts throughout the land: 
· f at a;: 
"that a party must recover, l .. 
on the case made by his pleadings ... " 61 AM. JUR. 2d ~ 
-6-
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l 
§ 382. Walker's cause of action was based exclusively on the 
tort of fraud, yet recovery was based exclusively on contract 
principles. The variance between the two theories is obvious 
and expansive and Walker never attempted to close the gap through 
amended pleadings. Therefore, Walker was improperly granted a 
recovery on a theory substantially variant from the cause that 
it plead. 
B. APPELLANT HAD INSUFFICIENT NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO 
MEET THE CONTRACT THEORY AND WAS THEREBY PREJUDICED. 
To avoid due process problems a party must have adequate no-
tice to meet the allegations of his opposition. This Court 
stated that principle best when it noted that: 
... if an issue is to be tried and a party's 
rights concluded with respect thereto, he 
must have notice thereof and an opportunity 
to meet it. 
National Farmers Union Property and Casualty Co. v, Thompson, 4 
Ut. 2d 7, 286 P. 2d 249, 253 (1955), quoting Taylor v. E. M. 
Royle, 264 P. 2d 279 (Utah, 1953) 
The case at bar is not unlike Taylor v. E. M. Royle, 
wherein the plaintiff sued to recover money allegedly owed him 
for employment services rendered to the defendant. The plaintiff 
managed a radio and television store under a written employment 
contract, the contract expired on March 1, 1951 and the plaintiff 
stayed on the job until July of 1951, when he quit. Plaintiff's 
cause of action was upon a "new contract" alleged to have been 
consummated between March and July of 1951. At no time did the 
plaintiff amend his pleadings, even at trial to conform to the 
1. See numerous citations to the rule at pl 779 of 
61 AM. JUR. Pleadings § 382. 
-7-
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proof, to reflect an action for quantum meruit. The trial court 
deemed no express contract existed, but permitted recovery 
under 
quantum meruit. In reversing that decision the Supreme Court 
held that it was error to charge the defendant with liabili~ 
under quantum meruit, an issue which the defendant was never 
called upon to meet. 
M. K. was never called upon to meet the contract issue that 
Walker forwarded first at trial. Walker never sought to appri~ 
M. K. that it would proceed under a theory different from that 
.. 
advanced by the pleadings. The Taylor Court emphasized the i~ 1 
partance of proper notice by stating: 
••• a defendant must be extended every reasonable 
opportunity to prepare his case and to meet an 
adversary's claims. Also he must be protected 
against suprise and be assured equal opportunity 
and facility to present and prove counterconnections, 
-else unilateral justice and injustice would re-
sult sufficient to raise serious doubts as to 
constitutional due process guarantees. 264 P. 2d 
at 280. 
In permitting Walker to recover on a theory neither plead 
nor revealed to M. K., the trial court abandoned this Court's 
concern for justice and permitted injustice to reign. Further, 
I 
the trial court did not see fit to look to the record to determinil 
if the issue had been raised in discovery or at any other level. 1 
If the trial court would have examined the record it would have 
d d no t raise~ found that the contract theory was never plea an was 
in the course of discovery or any other proceeding. 
Notice of a variant theory advanced at some pretrial stage 
could satisfy the concerns of the court in Taylor v. E. M. 
Royle Corp., supra and also in Radley v. Smith, 6 Ut. 2d 314 • 
313 P. 2d 465 (1957). In Radley the pleadings sounde 
d in conver;: 
-8-
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I 
I 
·1 
but the court permitted recovery based on contract because the 
pretrial order contained a contract issue. Therein both parties 
had notice of an issue variant from the pleadings some time before 
trial. Likewise, the plaintiff in Page v. Utah Home Finance 
Insurance Co., 15 Ut. 2d 257, 391 P. 2d 290 (1964), had "ample 
opportunity to meet the [new] issue", where three weeks before 
trial the defendant was permitted to amend, even after the pre-
trial order. 
The plaintiff is Page contended that the defendant's amended 
pleadings on fraud issues should not have been litigated at trial, 
in disagreeing, the Court determined that three weeks provided •.• 
"ample opportunity to meet the issue, and that is all that is 
required." 391 P. 2d 290. It cannot be said that M. K. had 
"ample opportunity" to meet Walker's issue of breach of contract. 
M. K. was never advised prior to trial or even during trial that 
Walker would abandon the fraud claim in favor of a contract 
cause of action. Certainly notice of some sort is required. 
M. K. could not be deemed to have received notice of the con-
tract theory via the evidence adduced at trial. All the evidence 
that Walker introduced was relevant to the fraud issue, and thus 
was not objectionable as being at variance with the pleadings. 
Evidence of the buy back agreement went to the heart of the fraud 
theory plead, but such evidence did not satisfy, indeed, was not 
even offered for the purposes of proving fraud; rather, Walker 
sought to use the evidence for a theory that M. K. was never 
advised of or given proper opportunity to meet. Therefore, M. K. 
was thereby prejudiced. 
C. APPELLANT IS NOT SUBJECT TO THE ELEMENTS OF U.R,C,P, lS(bl 
-9-
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BECAUSE IT DID NOT CONSENT TO TRIAL OF THE CONTAA~ 
ISSUE AND W!IS FOT Rr:QtJESTED TO OBJI:CT TO EVIDI:NCE U::, 
THE CONTRACT THEORY. 
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
as follows: 
Amendments to Con form to the Evidence. -When issues 
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express 
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be 
treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings 
as may be necessary to cause them to conform ~ 
the evidence and to raise these issues may be ~~c 
on motion of any party at any time, even after · 
judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect 
the result of the trial of these issues. If evider· 
is objected to at the trial on the ground that it .. , 
is not within the issues made by the pleading, the 
court may allow the pleadings to be amended when thE 
presentation of the merits of the action will be 
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to , 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidenq 
would prejudice him in maintaining his action or 
defense upon the merit. The court shall grant a corr 
tinuance, if necessary, to enable the objecting 
party to meet such evidence. 
This statute does not apply in the present case because M. K. 
neither consented to a trial on the contract issue nor was it 
required to object to the evidence introduced in support of~ 
contract theory. 
General Insurance Co. of America v. Carnicero DynastylS' 
545 P. 2d 502 (Utah, 1976); found the Court interpreting Rule 
. I 
15 (b) 's provision on consent to exist "where one party raises· 
issue material to the other party's case, or where evidence 15 
introduced without objection". 545 P. 2d at 506. Therein, 
defendant's counsel sought leave, pursuant to 15(b), to amend 
the inc"f defendant's answer and plead lack of consideration on 
agreements that were the subject of the lawsuit. The trial c: 
affir~·''., denied the motion claiming that the allegation was an 
-10-
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defense of which the plaintiff had no notice and further that 
the defendant had sufficient information from discovery to supply 
him with the necessary knowledge to amend the answer. In holding 
on behalf of the defendant, the Supreme Court determined that 
the issue of consideration had been tried by consent and the trial 
court erred in denying the defendant's motion to amend. In the 
present case Walker never bothered to amend the pleadings at 
any stage and introduced evidence that failed to provide M. K. 
with an objection to the variant theory because such evidence 
was part and parcel of the fraud claim, In effect Walker tried the 
case on a contract theory by itself, while M. K. defended against 
a fraud action, not being advised of anything different. The trial 
court erroneously determined that Walker could proceed in such a 
fashion and wrongly granted Walker a judgment. With the court 
permitting recovery on the unplead theory M. K. suffered a great 
disadvantage therefrom. M. K. thus fits within the dicta announced 
in National Farmers Union Property and Casualty v. Thompson, supra 
at p. 253 (1957) where the Court warned: 
... as this court has held on prior occasions the 
adverse party should be given the benefit of every 
doubt. He must not have been misled nor in any way 
prejudiced by the introduction of the new issues. 
This position was reinforced by the court a few years later in 
Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos, 6 Ut. 2d 226, 310 P. 2d 517, 519 
(1957); where the Court cautioned that: 
"Not withstanding all of our efforts to eliminate 
technicalities and liberalize procedure, we must not 
lose sight of the cardinal principle that ':111der our 
system of justice, if an issue is to be tried and 
a party's rights concluded with respect the7eto, 
he must have notice thereof and an opportunity to 
meet it." 
The simple facts herein show that M. K. had neither notice nor 
-11-
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opportunity to properly meet Walker's contract claim 
, without 
such M. K. cannot properly be found to have consented either 
expressly or impliedly to a trial of the contract issue. The;. 
fore, M. K. is not subject to Rule 15 (b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, unless the Court wishes to serve the ends of 
injustice. 
D. THE ERROR OR THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT BE SAVED BY THE 
CONCEPT OF AIDER BY VERDICT. 
Aider by verdict is a concept whereby a verdict or judgrre· 
cures a defective cause of action. There is a distinction bet 
defects which are fatal after verdict and those which are not, 
those which are fatal arise from an entire omission of a state· 
ment of the facts which are the gist of the action, and those 
which are not an imperfect statement of such facts. 61 AM. JC 
2d Pleadings § 408. In the case at bar there is a total amiss. 
of any statement of facts which are the gist of the action upc: 
which the court found in favor of Walker. 
In the often cited case of Arnold v. American Insurance_g, 
148 Cal. 660, 84 P. 182 (1906), the California court dealt wit 
suit based upon insurance policies where the policies requirec 
that the property be used as a dwelling. At no time did the;. 
tiff allege that the property was used as a dwelling, despite: 
fact the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff· In reve: 
d the suprE' the judgment, even though evidence showe occupancy, 
Court discussed aider by verdict and reasoned: 
It has however never been held that a defectiff 
' ' . h is pleading may be cured by verdict, whe~e t.e~e 
an entire absence of both direct and implie . 
allegation of a material fact, and such a ruling 
-12-
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would be in violation of fundamental principles 
relative to pleadings. 
walker occupies a position similar to the plaintiff in Arnold; 
however, the defects of Walker's pleadings are even more egregious 
in that nothing resembling a cause of action for breach of contract 
can be made out. All essential and vital elements of a theory 
that would permit the trial court to rule for Walker are absent 
from the pleadings; therefore, Walker cannot be rescued by the 
notion of aider by verdict. 
POINT II 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDING THAT DE-
FENDANT, THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT COMPLIED WITH ALL OF 
THE TEPJ-IB OF THE BUY BACK AGREEMENT. 
In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 104) the 
trial court determined by way of Finding #8 (R. 105) that: 
8. Walker Realty complied with all the terms of 
the agreement and made every effort to do so in 
good faith, making several requests both orally 
and in writing to take the machine back. Said 
requests were made in writing within the time 
specified and agreed to by Komputer Corporation. 
This Finding is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The 
buy back agreement (Exhibits 4 and 10) required the performance 
of certain conditions precedent prior to any duty arising in M. K. 
to repurchase the computer, these conditions were: 
1. All salesman will use the SX-320 as trained and 
instructed by Mr. David Morris and Robert Huff. 
2. If at the end of each month Walker Realty will 
contact M. K. Komputer Corporation, if they feel 
the SX-320 has not been a benefit to their sales. 
3. At this monthly time period if the SX-320 has 
not been a tool to increase sales, that our 
people be allowed to come in and retrain your 
salesman. 
4. Walker Realty agrees to pay for any damage to 
the SX-320 serial #200 285 and Real Estate programs 
if M. K. Komputer Corporation has to buy them back. 
Walker admitted that the first condition was not satisfied at trial 
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when he indicated only he and two other individuals h 
ad SUffi 
knowledge to operate the machine. (T. p. 61) 
There is some dispute as to the number of t · · raining sessi 
held and missed by the respective parties, but on at least ti 
occasions representatives from M. K. scheduled appointm~bt 
train Ralph Walker and his salesman, on both occasions the M, 
representative found only a secretary at the Walker facility, 
(T. pp. 84-84, 167) Therefore, there was no compliance with 
first provision of the buy back agreement. 
By the admission of Ralph Walker, provision number two c 
buy back agreement was not satisfied. In Walker's first writ 
communication after signing the lease, dated November 4, 1971 
(Exhibit 6), Walker indicated nothing negative about the mq 
in fact, Walker reported no negative comments until his lett1 
of January 20, 1977 (Exhibit 7). 
Walker's failure to make the monthly reports required b1 
the buy back agreement did not require M. K. to be held to ti 
repurchase provision of the contract. A few days after Walki 
first complaint he agreed to permit M. K. 's representatives I 
come to his facility and provide further training, after beii 
advised by Thomas Kunz of M. K. that M. K. would not honor tl 
back contract. (T.pp. 122-123) Only after the lapse of two 
additional months did Walker attempt to have M. K. repurchasi 
the computer. (Ex. 8 & 9) 
Examining the evidence in a light favorable to \\lalker, ~ 
evidence remains insufficient to support the trial court's F 
that Walker totally complied with all the conditions precede! 
the buy back agreement. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in permitting Walker to recover on a 
theory substantially variant from the pleadings and which is 
not supported by the weight of the eveidence. 
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Farr, Kaufman & Hamilton 
Bys~~~ W. fo.vv b~ 
STEPHN W. FARR Q u. 
Attorney for Appellant · · 
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the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Attorney for Respondent, 
Scott w. Barrett, 300 South Main, Logan, Utah 84321 on this 
_[fL___ day of January, 1980. 
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